Media Hub by Drone Federation India
One Rogue Drone Can Shut Down an Airport. Who Will Pay to Prevent It?
- Category: Policy Insights
- Published: 2026-02-04
- Author: Anushka Sikka, Smit Shah
Article
Originally published in ACP Magazine , Special Issue, Volume 25, released at Wings India 2026 , pp. 41-44. The link for same can be accessed here.
“Imagine a packed airport on a Monday morning. Boarding gates full. A single drone, small enough to fit in a backpack, crosses into the approach path. Within 40 seconds, three inbound flights are diverted, ATC is scrambling, and operations grind to a halt. This is not science fiction. This is the new normal airports must prepare for.”
India’s civil aviation ecosystem is entering a new phase of complexity as drones become more accessible, capable and deeply embedded across sectors. The proliferation of drone technology has brought significant benefits across industries, from agriculture to logistics, but it has also introduced new security challenges. The dual-use nature of drones, both in terms of their components and their final applications, has made it increasingly difficult to control their misuse. Many of the technologies that enable commercial drones, such as high-resolution cameras, autonomous navigation systems and long-endurance power sources, are equally applicable to military or malicious purposes. This overlap has enabled both state and non-state actors to exploit drones for illicit activities, including terrorism, espionage and smuggling. Additionally, there has been a surge in drone sightings and incursions near airports, which are either accidental or malicious in nature.
Aviation infrastructure such as commercial airports have recently become lucrative targets for non-state actors to deploy drones for causing disruption and creating a massive security scare. A disruptive incursion done using drones can have serious safety, security and economic consequences. On July 22, 2014, as an Airbus A320 was descending to land at London’s Heathrow Airport, the pilot spotted a drone resembling a helicopter just 700 feet above ground. The U.K.’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) later confirmed that the unidentified drone had flown dangerously close to the commercial aircraft, which had a capacity of 180 passengers. The incident was rated as a “serious risk of collision”, the highest level of concern the CAA assigns.
Despite investigations, authorities couldn’t trace the drone, which had vanished from sight and didn’t register on air traffic control systems. 1 This close call marked the beginning of a wave of similar drone-related events worldwide. This included three incidents in the United Arab Emirates in 2016 that temporarily shut down operations at Dubai Airport, and one of them also closed Sharjah International Airport. 2 Similarly, operations at Gatwick Airport in 2018 were abruptly suspended following reports of two drones flying in proximity to the airfield. Incoming flights were diverted to alternate airports. This incident resulted in approximately 140,000 passengers being stranded and inflicted financial losses amounting to tens of millions of pounds on the industry. 3 Such incursions have highlighted the critical need for robust counter-drone measures at airports.
India has also witnessed such drone sightings, the most recent being at Imphal International Airport in October 2025. The Indigo flight from Agartala to Imphal reported the sighting of a drone on its final approach path from the city side, at an altitude between 3600 and 4000 feet. 4 Similar disruptions have been reported in Amritsar and Jammu Airport. As a result, flight operations were disrupted, causing chaos and uncertainty for numerous passengers.
These incidents have exposed a structural blind spot in airport security. For decades, aviation security architecture has been engineered around terrestrial, perimeter-based, and passenger-focused threats. It was never designed to detect or respond to a small, low-observable aircraft flying above the ground and navigating directly into controlled airspace. 5 This blind spot is reflected in the technical limitations of the detection and response systems airports use today for drone incursions. Airports have radars powerful enough to track jetliners 200 km away, but many still struggle to reliably detect a drone from a kilometre out.
Despite rapid experimentation with Counter-UAS technologies, current airport detection architectures remain fragmented and technically constrained. Some drones today can fly entire missions with no radio signals at all, making the best RF detectors blind. A systematic review in Elsevier Journal of drone detection in airport environments finds that while radar offers long-range coverage and RF sensing achieves high classification accuracy, each modality has significant blind spots, and robust performance only emerges in multi-sensor systems that are still costly and immature for widespread deployment. 6 Small multi-rotor drones often have radar cross-sections between those of birds and large insects, making them difficult to distinguish from clutter and biological targets. 7 Visual, acoustic and RF-based methods also struggle with diverse drone sizes, dynamic flight behaviour and confusion with other flying objects, leading to false alarms and missed detections. 8 Moreover, RF-based detection must operate in already congested spectrum around airports, which can complicate reliable sensing. However, the greater interference risk comes from RF jamming and other active countermeasures, which regulators tightly restrict near airports because they can disrupt communications and navigation systems. 9
The challenge is sharpened further when viewed against how security infrastructure is currently financed at Indian airports. According to a PIB statement by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, airport operators are responsible for provisioning a wide suite of safety and security systems. These include in-line baggage screening, explosive-trace and metal detection systems, perimeter intrusion detection systems, X-ray baggage inspection, fire-safety installations, and aircraft-rescue related equipment. 10
These are capital-intensive assets but fall squarely within the operational and regulatory scope of the airport operator, and their costs are typically recovered through user fees and aeronautical charges. In contrast, certain specialised or national-security-sensitive systems, such as radiological detection equipment, have been funded by the central government through BCAS, reflecting a recognition that some threat domains extend beyond the remit and cost-recovery ability of individual airports. 11
India already allocates security responsibilities across multiple entities, depending on the nature of the threat and its national relevance. Against this backdrop, C-UAS technology is situated at the intersection of airspace surveillance, aviation security, and law-enforcement response. Its functions span multiple domains, making it unsuitable to assign to a single stakeholder. Without an ascertained financing model for C-UAS technology, it remains stranded between stakeholders, slowing adoption despite urgent operational need.
This ambiguity also creates a cost-recovery dilemma. Unlike terminal security equipment, C-UAS systems cannot be easily linked to passenger-based revenue streams. Thus, making it difficult for airport operators to justify the investment. At the same time, the public-good nature of airspace security limits the ability of governments to rely solely on airport-level funding.
International frameworks, including ICAO and ACI principles on security cost allocation, emphasise, cost-relatedness and equitable allocation. Supported with shared responsibility and national oversight for emerging threats such as these. 1213 India therefore requires a scalable and interoperable financing model that distributes costs sensibly across stakeholders while ensuring consistent protection across its airport network.
A pragmatic path forward for India is a blended funding model that aligns national security priorities with the operational capabilities of airport operators. Given that airspace protection is inherently a sovereign responsibility, the central government through the Ministry of Civil Aviation should underwrite a significant portion of the initial capital expenditure for C-UAS deployment. This can take the form of partial direct funding or long-term, low-interest capital loans earmarked specifically for security modernisation, enabling airports to adopt advanced systems without distorting their balance sheets or aeronautical charges.
Airport operators can finance partial installation, integration, maintenance and lifecycle upgrades of these systems. This shall be in alignment with their role in adoption and management of other security and operational technologies. This hybrid approach balances fiscal burden on the government and ensures consistent deployment across airports of varying sizes. It also preserves regulatory coherence by allowing the central authority to standardise technical specifications, software protocols, data-sharing frameworks, and training requirements for technology that has national security implications.
Thus, this blended model offers the financial realism and institutional clarity needed to jumpstart nationwide C-UAS adoption. Once the financial mechanism is defined, airports can start investing in dedicated detection systems. This also allows technologies to be standardised across airports and gives vendors the stability they need to scale and improve their products. Additionally, challenges like integration with existing surveillance layers, interoperability across airports, and establishing common response protocols, become far easier to resolve when funding is consistent and predictable. In essence, a stable financing framework acts as the catalyst that turns C-UAS from isolated pilots into a mature, nationwide airspace-protection mechanism. Airports once secured their boundaries on the ground. Now, they must secure boundaries that move at 250 km/h in three dimensions.
References:
• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/07/drone-near-miss-passenger-plane-heathrow
• https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/drone-halts-traffic-at-dubai-airport-1586626
• https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/cost-of-gatwick-drone-chaos-expected-to-run-into-tens-of-millions-a4030751.html
• https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/flight-ops-temporarily-suspended-at-imphal-airport-after-drone-sighting-9406256
• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590005625001389
• Ibid.
• https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/164563/7/164563.pdf
• https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/24/1/125.
• https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/14/12/2483
• https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1777191
• Ibid.
• https://www.icao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/9082_10ed_en.pdf
• https://www.aci-asiapac.aero/advocacy/economics/policy-area/airport-charges